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In order to ensure the confidentially, integrity, and availability of networked 
resources operating on the Global Information Grid, the Department of Defense has 
incorporated a “Defense-in-Depth” posture.  This posture includes the use of network 
security mechanisms and does not rely on a single defense for protection.  Firewalls, 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS’s), Anti-Virus (AV) software, and routers are such 
tools used. 
In recent years, computer security discussion groups have included IDS’s as one 
of their most relevant issues.  These systems help identify intruders that exploit 
vulnerabilities associated with operating systems, application software, and computing 
hardware. 
When IDS’s are utilized on a host computer or network, there are two primary 
approaches to detecting and / or preventing attacks.  Traditional IDS’s, like most AV 
software, rely on known “signatures” to detect attacks.  This thesis will focus on the 
secondary approach:  Anomaly or “behavioral based” IDS’s look for abnormal patterns of 
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Defense in Depth:  The DoD approach for establishing an adequate IA 
posture in a shared-risk environment that allows for a shared mitigation 
through: the integration of people, technology, and operations; the 
layering of IA solutions within and among IT assets; and, the selection of 
IA solutions based on their relative level of robustness. 
DoD Directive 8500.1, October 24, 2002 
A. PROLOGUE 
The intent of this chapter is to inform the reader of an aspect of information 
assurance that until recently, has not been considered a substantial problem.  In addition, 
it will provide a description of a Defense-in-Depth posture and introduce the hypothesis.  
It will continue with discussion about Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS’s), their 
placement, approaches, etc, and will discuss attack methodologies and attack types.  It 
will conclude with a synopsis of the remaining chapters of this thesis. 
B. BACKGROUND 
In Greek mythology, it is believed that the Trojan Horse was an instrument of war 
used by the Greeks to access the city of Troy.  In today’s electronic society, the Trojan 
Horse is used by nefarious individuals to gain access to our most prized resource:  
information.  As this “electronic war” proliferates, information security efforts will 
increase as System Administrators (SysAdmins) make haste to patch, harden, and secure 
their networks / systems.  These laborious tasks are conducted in order to ensure the 
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) of information that is processed, stored, 
or transmitted via Department of Defense (DoD) networks that operate on the Global 
Information Grid (GIG). 
Although there is no “iron-clad” solution that keeps both malicious individuals off 
DoD networks or its information safe, there are methods employed that help curtail these 
intrusions.  The DoD has formulated a modular, “Defense-in-Depth” strategy that builds 
upon multiple layers of network protection.  This strategy is synonymous with Joseph 
Dell’s “layered security model.”  Mr. Dell, Technology Director for InfoSecurity and 
Risk Management Consulting maintains:  
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This model means you’ve got firewalls, IDS’s, authentication servers, and 
encryption servers” [INFOSEC-03].  The DoD not only uses this 
approach, but also utilizes complementary technology as well.  
Specifically, DoD SysAdmins utilize “firewalls, intrusion detection and 
prevention systems, virus scanners, and content filtering devices that 
protect against not only external attacks but also internal threats as well” 
[NETSCREEN-03]. 
The Information Assurance Technical Framework (IATF) released the following 
four guiding principles for a Defense-in-Depth posture.  It is these principles the DoD 
uses as guidelines for the Defense-in-Depth initiative. 
1. Deploy Security Solutions Everywhere 
Defense-in-Depth involves the deployment of protection mechanisms at multiple 
locations to resist all classes of attacks.  When the network infrastructure is distributed, it 
is important to have proper security mechanisms at different areas to protect all networks 
from attacks [IATF-01]. 
2. Use Multiple Layers of Security Solutions to Protect the Network 
Against Intrusions and Attacks 
Defense-in-Depth includes deploying multiple layers of defense between the 
adversary and his target.  Multiple defenses include firewalls, intrusion detection and 
prevention, virus scanning, and other technologies, all working in parallel.  Table 1 
displays technologies available to implement each layer of defense [IATF-01]. 
3. Protect the Support Infrastructure 
Networks, systems, and security mechanisms depend on a support infrastructure, 
which must be protected from adversaries.  The support infrastructure includes elements 
such as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), directory services, and user authentication 
infrastructure [IATF-01]. 
4. Collect and Analyze Security Events to Determine Threat Levels 
Defense-in-Depth includes the continuous collection and analysis of intrusions 
and other security events.  This information is used to determine the threat levels of 
network infrastructure, so that network administrators can properly and promptly react to 








Enforces access control on network traffic, selectively allowing 
external entities to access information protected by it.  Firewalls 
are also used for denial-of-service (DoS) protection to defend 
networks against external or internal DoS attacks. 
VPN 
Provides confidentiality and integrity to the data transmitted 
across a public network.  VPNs also facilitate the 
implementation of communities of interest (COIs) 
Intrusion Detection 
and Prevention (IDP) 
Detects and blocks network attacks.  IDP systems use knowledge 
of higher level protocols and applications to identify network 
attacks 
Content Filtering Performs content checking mechanisms for passing data, including anti-virus detection and protection 
Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) 
Authenticates users, devices and applications when sending, 
receiving or accessing information. 
 
Table 1.   Defense-in-Depth Technologies 
 
C. HYPOTHESIS 
The inclusion of an anomaly based Intrusion Detection System has no significant 
effect on the security posture of a network that operates in a Defense-in-Depth 
environment.  This statement arises because traditional security experts believe that 
anomaly based IDS’s provide too many “false positives” to be considered helpful.  They 
maintain that signature based IDS’s, when working in unison with other layered security 
devices, handle the majority of the workload, therefore rendering the anomaly based IDS 
useless. 
1. Ho 
An anomaly based IDS has no prolific impact on a network’s security posture 
because the other complementary security devices provide adequate redundancy. 
2. Ha 
There is a measurable “value added” of anomaly based IDS’s compared to 
networks that solely use signature based IDS’s. 
This thesis will prove the Null Hypothesis statistically insignificant.  It will use α  
= .05 (significance level) to provide evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis. 
The premise of this thesis is to analyze the theory quantitatively that networks 
operating on the GIG must adhere to a Defense-in-Depth posture.  Specifically, its 
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purpose is to focus on the aforementioned second principle that pertains to the 
implementation of IDS’s as layered devices in a Defense-in-Depth posture.  The intent of 
this thesis’ experiment is to collect data from a network that incorporates both signature 
and anomaly based IDS’s as the networks layered security devices.  It will justify the 
“value added” of an anomaly based IDS that operates in conjunction with a signature 
based IDS. 
Figure 1 is an organizational model of a single layer line of defense and Figure 2 




















Figure 2.   Defense-in-Depth Model Used By DoD [From: NetScreen] 
 
D. IDS DESCRIPTION 
In order to describe an IDS, intrusion detection must first be defined:  It is the 
process of monitoring events occurring in a computer system or network and analyzing 
them for signs of intrusions, defined as attempts to compromise the confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, or to bypass the security mechanisms of a computer or network.  
Intrusions are caused by attackers accessing the systems from the Internet, authorized 
users of the systems who attempt to gain additional privileges for which they are not 
authorized, and authorized users who misuse the privileges given them.  Therefore, an 
IDS is defined as:  “software or hardware products that automate this monitoring and 
analysis process” [BACE-00]. 
E. IDS TYPES 
Intrusion detection systems comprise both hardware appliances and software 
applications.  The majority of IDS’s are network based systems.  They are either stand 
alone appliances or network sniffing software.  These types capture and analyze 
information packets as they traverse a network.  Their complement, host-based systems, 
reside as application software on a host computer.  Furthermore, application based IDS’s 
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are a subset of Host-based IDS’s.  These types analyze events that occur within the 
application software.  “Programs can scan computer records or on-line computer activity 
for patterns that indicate or suggest the presence of unauthorized activity” [DENN-02]. 
F. IDS APPROACHES 
There are two approaches used when detecting intrusion attempts. 
1.   Signature Based IDS 
Recognizes a known signature or pattern that resides in a local knowledge base 
established by the vendor.  Periodically, IDS vendors issue signature “update” messages 
so the consumer can update his local knowledge base.  These systems can be configured 
to automatically check the vendor website for updates and install them accordingly.  Bace 
refers to these types of systems as “misuse” detectors. 
2.   Anomaly or “Behavioral” Based System 
Anomaly detectors identify abnormal unusual behavior (anomalies) on a 
host computer or network.  They function on the assumption that attacks 
are different from “normal” activity and can therefore be detected by 
systems that identify these differences.  Anomaly detectors construct a 
normal behavior profile of authorized / legitimate users, hosts, or network 
connections.  These profiles are constructed from historical data collected 
over a period of normal operation.  The detectors then collect event data 
and use a variety of measures to determine when monitored activity 
deviates from the norm [BACE-00]. 
G. IDS PLACEMENT 
IDS’s can operate as independent, stand alone, network based systems on either 
side of a network firewall device.  Network based IDS’s identify and prevent intruders 
that exist external to a network or recognize internal threats as well.  IDS’s also operate 
as host-based systems that reside on a local computer and are generally application 
software.  These types of systems identify attempted privilege escalation or those user 
characteristics outside normal parameters (obscure web sites, unauthorized access, etc). 
H. ATTACK TYPES 








Passive attacks include traffic analysis, monitoring of unprotected 
communications, decrypting weakly encrypted traffic, and capture 
of authentication information (e.g., passwords).  Passive intercept 
of network operations can give adversaries indications and 
warnings of impending actions. Passive attacks can result in 
disclosure of information or data files to an attacker without the 
consent or knowledge of the user.  Examples include the disclosure 
of personal information such as credit card numbers and medical 
files. 
Active 
Active attacks include attempts to circumvent or break protection 
features, introduce malicious code, or steal or modify information.  
These attacks may be mounted against a network backbone, exploit 
information in transit, electronically penetrate and enclave, or 
attack an authorized remote user during an attempt to connect to an 
enclave. Active attacks can result in the disclosure or dissemination 
of data files, denial of service, or modification of data. 
Close-In 
Close-in attacks consist of a regular type individual attaining close 
physical proximity to networks, systems, or facilities for the 
purpose of modifying, gathering, or denying access to information.  
Close physical proximity is achieved through surreptitious entry, 
open access, or both. 
Insider 
Insider attacks can be malicious or nonmalicious.  Malicious 
insiders intentionally eavesdrop, steal or damage information, use 
information in a fraudulent manner, or deny access to other 
authorized users.  Nonmalicious attacks typically result from 
carelessness, lack of knowledge, or intentional circumvention of 
security from such reasons as “getting the job done.” 
Distribution 
Distribution attacks focus on the malicious modification of 
hardware or software at the factory or during distribution.  These 
attacks can introduce malicious code into a product, such as a 
backdoor to gain unauthorized access to information or a system 
function at a later date. 
 
Table 2.   Attack Types 
 
In addition to these preceding descriptions, several additional attack types warrant 
attention.  In his thesis “Using Network Management Systems to Detect Distributed 






1. Denial of Service Attack 
Characterized by an attacker trying to prevent the use of resources by legitimate 
or authorized users.  It is a “dominating conversation with a network resource designed to 
preclude other conversations with that resource” [STROT-00]. 
Examples include: 
• attempts to “flood” a network, thereby preventing legitimate network  
• traffic 
• attempts to disrupt connections between two machines, thereby  
• preventing access to a service 
• attempts to prevent a particular individual from accessing a service 
• attempts to disrupt service to a specific system or person [NEGI-01] 
2. Distributed Denial of Service Attack 
Amplified by adding a “many to one” relationship to these attacks, making them 
more difficult to prevent [NEGI-01]. 
I. ATTACK METHODOLOGIES 
1.   Denial of Service Attack Methodologies 
Table 3 displays widely used DOS methods.  These types of attacks take 















This attack exploits a “lack of bounds” defect associated when 
reassembling IP packets.  This attack occurs because fragments were sent 
with offsets that do not align. 
Ping of 
Death (PoD) 
Directed towards the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echo 
request.  ICMP is used with a small payload to provide a fast, low 
bandwidth test of connectivity.  Because of this typical usage, some 
software applications do not handle large payloads. If such software 
receives an ICMP request packet with a payload greater than 4000 bytes 





A network security breach in which a network connected to the Internet 
is swamped with replies to ICMP echo (PING) requests.  A Smurf 
attacker sends PING requests to an Internet broadcast address.  These are 
special addresses that broadcast all received messages to the hosts 
connected to the subnet.  Each broadcast address can support up to 255 
hosts, so a single PING request can be multiplied 255 times.  The return 
address of the request itself is spoofed to be the address of the attacker’s 
victim.  All the hosts receiving the PING request reply to this victim’s 
address instead of the real sender’s address.  A single attacker sending 
hundreds or thousands of these PING messages per second can fill the 
victim’s T-1 (or even T-3) line with ping replies, bringing the entire 
Internet service to its knees. 
UDP Flood 
This attack is based on UDP echo and character generator (chargen) 
services.  Forged UDP packets are used to connect the ‘echo service’ on 
one machine to the ‘chargen service’ on the other machine.  The result is 
that the two services consume all available network bandwidth between 
the machines as they exchange characters between themselves. 
Land Attack 
The source and destination addresses are identical, therefore the “victim” 
consumes all its resources talking to itself, thereby obstructing outside 
conversations. 
 





2. Distributed Denial of Service Attacks Methodologies 





The conversation between the master and the slave(s) uses TCP, 
while the conversation with the attack daemons uses UDP.  The 
implemented attack is a UDP flood. 
Tribe Flood Network 
(TFN) 
Conversations between the master and the slave(s) uses ICMP 
echo reply packets.  The type of attack could be variations of 
Smurf, SYN flood, UDP flood, and ICMP flood attacks. 
TFN2K 
This is the newer version of the TFN attack and uses TCP, UDP, 
ICMP, or all three to communicate between the master and the 
slave(s) and the communication is encrypted.  The attacks 
implemented are the same as TFN. 
Stacheldracht 
This is based on the TFN attack.  The conversation between 
master and slave(s) is encrypted and uses TCP and ICMP.  
Implemented attacks are the same as TFN. 
Shaft 
Modeled after Trinoo.  Conversation between master and slave(s) 
is achieved using UDP packets and implemented attack is the 
UDP flood attack.  An important feature of this attack is its ability 
to switch control master servers and ports in real time, thereby 
making the detection by intrusion detection tools difficult. 
 
Table 4.   Distributed Denial of Service Attack Methodologies [From: NEGI-01]. 
 
Although this is not a totally inclusive list of attack types or methodologies, 
mainly because there are many not yet detected or developed, its intention is to enlighten 
the reader to some currently known. 
J. INTRUDERS 
Intruders can fall in two broad categories:  Those individuals considered “outside” 
of an organizations network and those currently employed are considered “inside.”  Most 
people perceive the outside intruder as the biggest threat.  The media scare about 
“hackers,” “crackers,” and “attackers” attempting access over the internet has heightened 
this perception.  Recent FBI studies revealed that ninety percent of those U.S. companies 
that experienced internet fraud in a two-year period were victims of the worst intruder 




The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter II will discuss the 
roles of those complementary devices required in a Defense-in-Depth posture.  It will 
furthermore provide a preliminary view of the planned intrusion experiment.  Chapter III 
will describe the conduct of this thesis’ experiment and gather the necessary evidence 
needed to substantiate the alternative hypothesis.  Chapter IV will analyze and discuss the 
data captured during the experiment.  Chapter V will analyze and make statistical 
inferences on the collected data.  It will prove either the null or alternative hypothesis as 
statistically significant.  Chapter VI offers conclusions and recommendations for further 
work and the Appendix is an article from InfoWorld Magazine dated 26 August 2004.  
This involves an IDS comparison with which the author was involved. 
L.   CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In summary, this chapter exposed the reader to problems that occur when 
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II. PROBLEM PROPOSAL, COMPLEMENTARY IDS DEVICES, 
AND EXPERIMENT OVERVIEW 
Whereas access controls and filters seek to prevent unauthorized or 
damaging activity, intrusion and misuse detection mechanisms aim to 
detect it at its outset or after the fact. 
Dorothy Denning, Information Warfare and Security, 2002 
A. PROLOGUE 
This chapter will present the reader with a significant problem encountered when 
only a signature based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is deployed with other layered 
security devices.  Additionally, it will offer general descriptions of those complementary 
devices that work with both Host and Network Based IDS’s.  It will conclude with an 
overview of this thesis’ planned intrusion detection system experiment. 
B. SYNOPSIS OF IDS PROBLEM 
Information assurance professionals, both DoD affiliated and those that perform 
their duties in the commercial arena, must comprehend the “value added” of 
incorporating anomaly based IDS’s in conjunction with other layered security devices, to 
include signature based IDS’s. 
Network defenses that are established with signature based IDS’s will only 
identify deterministic, predefined patterns of attack.  For example, the SNORT IDS 
currently has over 2300 identified signatures in its knowledge base.  This is all well and 
good for those known attacks, but what about those attacks that are newly written, not yet 
discovered, or polymorphic?  With a signature based IDS, the known signature is 
compared to the datagram as it passes by the IDS.  If the knowledge base is current with 
signatures, known attacks are identified at this point.  If the knowledge base is not up to 
date, then the intrusion is allowed to pass. 
However, if an anomaly based IDS is employed with other complementary 
boundary defenses, any conversation that is out of a statistically normal pattern will be 
flagged as an intrusion and an appropriate warning will be sent.  These warning messages 




C. DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH DEFINITION 
The Department of Defense (DoD) uses the term “Defense-in-Depth” to describe 
its approach to Information Assurance (IA).  This approach integrates the capabilities of 
people, operations, and technology to establish a multi-layer and multi-dimensional 
protection of DoD assets.  The Defense-in-Depth approach builds mutually supporting 
layers of defense to reduce vulnerabilities and help protect against, detect, and react to as 
many attacks as possible.  The goal of this defense is to cause an intruder who penetrates 
or breaks down one defensive layer to encounter multiple barriers promptly until the 
quest for unauthorized entrance ends [DISA-01]. 
In order to ensure the success of a Defense-in-Depth posture, the DoD 
recommends defense of the following four elements:  Local Computing Environments 
(also known as Enclaves); Enclave Boundaries; Networks that link Enclaves; and 
Supporting Infrastructures. 
1. Local Computing Environment - (Enclave) 
The Enclave is comprised of those computing assets that are utilized within an 
organization.  This includes data and information, software applications (commercial and 
proprietary), data processing technology, personnel, and those facilities that reside under 
a singular authoritative, security-related uniform corporate policy. 
Items that comprise an enclave include: Intranet, service layer networks, Secret 
Internet Protocol (IP) Router Network (SIPRNet), Remote LANS or systems, and Virtual 
Private Networks (VPN). 
2. Enclave Boundaries 
These points connect the local area network (LAN) to the Internet.  This is where 
the de-militarized zone (DMZ), firewalls, routers, network based IDS’s, and proxy 
servers are established.  The defense of the enclave boundary should include protecting 
data integrity as it traverses the network, protecting the physical and logical boundaries of 
the enclave, and protecting the availability of those systems and networks that operate 
internal to an enclave. 
3. Enclave Linked Networks 
At the network level, the transport mechanisms used for user traffic is the focus of 
Defense-in-Depth.  These mechanisms include transmission and switching capabilities.  
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Examples of networks include the Non-Classified IP Router Network (NIPRNet), 
SIPRNet, the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), and the 
Defense Information Systems Network (DISN). 
4. Supporting Infrastructures 
These provide security services for networks, enclaves, and computing 
environments. Examples of supporting infrastructures include: cryptography and key 
management; incident detection, reporting, and response. 
D. COMPLEMENTARY ENCLAVE BOUNDARY DEFENSES 
Enclave Boundary Defenses protect those services and data from lurking outlying 
dangers.  They also protect those elements within an enclave that do not protect 
themselves [DISA-01].  The technologies associated with defending enclave boundaries 
include antivirus protection, content filtering devices, firewalls, identification and 
authentication devices, intrusion detection, intrusion prevention, malicious code 
detectors, proxy servers, virtual private networks, public key infrastructure, SPAM 
blocking devices, Secure Shell, and IPSec.  Enclave boundary defenses are the focus of 
this thesis. 
1. Anti-Virus Protection (AV) 
AV protection programs are utilities that search boot sector blocks, hard disks, 
mail programs, executable files, or application software for viruses and either deletes or 
quarantines those found.  Most AV programs include auto-update and auto-scan features.  
Automatic update features enable the software kernel to download profiles or 
“signatures” of new viruses while automatic scan enables the ability to check for those 
newly discovered viruses.  AV software is designed to establish a baseline or signature 
knowledge base for the system files and application software and regularly monitor and 
verify that their integrity is maintained. 
2. Content Filtering Devices 
These devices, also known as content security devices, apply security policies to 
the content or “payload” of a datagram.  This collectively refers to AV, content 
monitoring (URL filtering), and e-mail filtering. Unlike infrastructure elements, such as 
routers, firewalls and many IDS’s that look at content independent of context, a content 
filtering device must reassemble the datagram before the content can be analyzed. 
 16 
 
3. Firewalls:  (Gateways) 
Firewalls consist of network appliances (personal computers, routers, or dedicated 
hardware) or host-based application software that filters all inbound traffic from 
untrusted sources into a LAN or other private system.  These systems can also be used as 
access control mechanisms to filter those personnel within an organization seeking access 
to the Internet.  These devices rely on information that is generated at all levels of the 
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model.  “As a rule, the higher the OSI layer at 
which your firewall examines these packets, the greater the protection provided” 
[MAIRS-02]. 
Hardware firewall products protect your computer and home network by guarding 
your Internet connection and filtering any requests that you have not specifically allowed. 
Software firewalls are installed directly on your PC, and filter requests after they 
reach your computer.  These are often less expensive and easier to configure than 
hardware firewalls.  They furthermore ease the burden of having to reconfigure the 
abundant “spaghetti” coil of cables whenever a new system is incorporated.  Software 
firewalls provide more assurance than simple router firewalls because they provide 
additional protection from spyware and Trojan horses.  If you travel with a laptop, a 
software firewall is a necessity—you need protection wherever you connect to the 
Internet, and your hardware firewall can protect you only at home [NORTH-02]. 
There are basically four types of firewalls. 
a. Packet Filtering Gateways 
These are the most basic form of firewalls.  They work by applying rule 
set filters against packets of data that traverse networks.  A packet filtering firewall 
regulates traffic flow based on TCP/IP header information.  The packets that pass through 
the filters are sent to the requesting system and all others are discarded.  There are two 
types of packet filtering firewalls:  Stateless and Stateful. 
• Stateless firewalls evaluate each datagram and maintain no “state” of 
conversation. 
• Stateful filters “listen to all communications and store these conversations 
in memory” [MAIRS-02].  Packet filtering firewalls generally only check 
information at OSI layer 3. 
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b. Circuit Level Gateways (CLG) 
These firewalls act as the conduit that connects an external enclave source 
computer to an internal LAN destination host.  This is accomplished by the source first 
establishing a connection to an available CLG port and then the CLG connects to the 
intended destination computer.  Acting as middle-man, the CLG copies verbatim all data 
bytes from the source to the respective destination.  Internal network information is 
concealed from outside sources because it appears the CLG is the originator.  These 
firewalls filter packets up to OSI Layer 5. 
c. Application Level Gateways 
These firewalls examine all traversing packets.  However, they first copy 
and then forward all packets through the firewall by performing as a proxy.  Since this is 
an OSI Layer 7 event, only those specific protocols can copy, filter, or forward individual 
type traffic.  For example, if a file transfer protocol (FTP) application level firewall is 
being used, only FTP traffic is allowed to pass through the firewall, all others are 
rejected. 
d.  Stateful Multi-Layer Inspection (SMLI) Gateways 
These firewalls are combinations of the previously mentioned gateways in 
paragraphs a, b, and c.  They allow legitimate users direct access to the internet by 
maintaining dynamic state tables on every conversation made.  They inspect packets at 
Layer 3 and also inspect the contents of Layer 7 as well.  They are considered to be 
“Stateful” firewalls, meaning they remember characteristics of data packets that traverse 
the network.  Although they require more micro-processing time, these firewalls compare 
received packets with those saved, and then decide on datagram passage.  In his book, 
“VPN’s, A Beginner’s Guide,” Mairs refers to this as a “direct transparent connection” 
between a client and host. 
4. Identification and Authentication Devices 
Identification and authentication tools are used as recognition devices for those 
remote users requesting enclave access.  These control mechanisms perform their duties 
by verifying Personal Identification Numbers (PIN’s), strong passwords, the various 




5. Intrusion Detection Systems 
Described in Chapter I. 
6. Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS’s) 
IPS’s are considered the next logical step in the evolution of IDS’s.  These 
systems are the combination of the blocking capabilities of firewalls with the deep packet 
inspection capability of IDS’s.  An IPS is defined as “any device (hardware or software) 
that has the ability to detect attacks, both known and unknown, and prevent the attack 
from being successful” [DESAI-03].  IPS’s are emerging technologies, and as of this 
writing research is ongoing. 
7. Malicious Code Detectors 
Malicious code is usually classified according to both its propagation method and 




Programs that self-replicate within a host by attaching themselves to 
programs and/or documents that become carriers of the malicious 
code. 
Worms Self-replicate across a network. 
Trojan 
Horses 
Masquerade as useful programs but contain malicious code to attack 
the system or leak data. 
Back Doors 
Open the system to external entities by subverting the local security 
policies to allow remote access and control over a network. 
Spy-Ware 
Is a useful software package that also transmits private user data to 
an external entity. 
 
Table 5.   Malicious Code Types 
 
Malicious code detectors are those software applications that possess the ability to 
process, screen, and identify malevolent datagram packets that bi-directionally traverse a 
network.  These systems, usually Stateful in nature, must be placed at the Enclaves 
boundary in order to identify and destroy harmful code. 
8. Proxy Servers 




a. IP Address Translator 
A firewall that uses a process called “address translation” to map all of 
your internal IP addressees to one IP address that is externally visible to those outside 
your network.  This address is associated with the firewall from which all outgoing 
packets originate [MAIRS-02]. 
b. Request Filter 
Proxy servers can also be used to filter requests.  For example, a company 
might use a proxy server to prevent its employees from accessing a specific set of Web 
sites.  This capability is particularly useful when such sites are known sources of 
malicious code or other hostile action [WEB-03]. 
9. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
PKI involves the use of the asymmetric private – public key pair and ensures that 
confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity of a message is maintained.  PKI algorithms 
allow for digital signatures which provide three important security services: 
a. Integrity 
Any change to the contents of a message during transport results in 
message integrity failure. 
b. Non-Repudiation 
Only the holder of a private key can digitally sign a message.  Since each 
private key is unique to an individual, this cannot be refuted. 
c. Authentication 
This is a way to identity if the sender of an electronically transmitted 
message is legitimate.  The recipient can be assured that the messages origin and author 
are bona fide. 
10. Virtual Private Networks (VPN) 
A VPN is a “virtual” network that is kept private by “tunneling” private data 
through the underlying infrastructure of the public Internet [MAIRS-02].  VPN’s achieve 
security through “end-to-end” authentication and encryption.  Data packets are 
encapsulated within network protocols that are understood at both the sending and 
receiving ends of transmission.  This is referred to as the VPN tunnel.  The entry point 
system encapsulates the data packets while the exit point removes the data from the 
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encapsulated datagram.  VPN’s create virtual circuits by special tunneling protocols and 
must encapsulate each source network packet into a packet that contains the connection 
management intelligence necessary to establish and disassemble the tunnel. 
VPN tunnels are based on two types of protocols:  The first, established at Layer 
2, uses frames as their exchange unit.  Layer 2 tunneling provides extra protection by 
encrypting all of each datagram except the link-level information.  This prevents a 
listener from obtaining information about network structure. While this encryption 
prevents traffic analysis, the datagram must be encrypted and/or decrypted on every 
network hop. 
The second tunneling protocol is established at Layer 3 and uses packets as the 
transfer mule.  Layer 3 protocols encapsulate IP packets into an additional header before 
transfer occurs. 
11. SPAM Blocking Devices 
SPAM is defined as the posting of irrelevant or inappropriate messages to one or 
more Usenet newsgroups, mailing lists, or other messaging system in deliberate or 
accidental violation of netiquette.  It is basically flooding the Internet with many copies 
of the same message.  Spammers are attempting to force their message on people who 
would not otherwise choose to receive it.  Fortunately, for the consumer, there are various 
SPAM control devices (hardware and software) that are available on the commercial 
market.  Favored choices are Bayesian filtering and heuristics, followed by 
signature/content matching, and blacklisting [INFOSEC-04]. 
12. Secure Shell (SSH) 
A Unix shell program for logging into and executing commands on remote 
computers.  SSH is intended to replace “rlogin” and “rsh,” and provide secure encrypted 
communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.  X11 
connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel 
[WEB-03]. 
13. IPSEC 
A protocol that provides security for transmission of sensitive information over 
unprotected networks such as the Internet. IPsec acts at the network layer, protecting and 
authenticating IP packets between participating devices (“peers”) [WEB-03]. 
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E. EXPERIMENT OVERVIEW 
The test bed that will be used for the IDS comparison experiment consists of 
several desktop computers and IDS servers that operate on a single Fast Ethernet 
network.  This LAN is configured with broadband Internet access via a satellite 
transmitting/receiving antenna.  These computer hosts will be configured with various 
operating systems and application software in such a manner as to monitor and collect 
information from those nefarious attempts that probe or penetrate the networks defenses. 
The networks architectural defense strategy will model a Defense-in-Depth 
posture.  In order to measure the effectiveness of this strategy, quantifiable instances of 
intrusions or penetrations must be incurred.  The experiment’s goal is to analyze those 
malicious activities identified by both the signature based and anomaly based IDS’s.  The 
hosts will be configured with complementary defensive devices.  However, the outer 
perimeter of the network will host both the signature and anomaly based IDS servers.  
These servers will monitor all traffic that bi-directionally traverses the network.  The 
experiment’s analysis phase’s intent is to interpolate the differences associated with both 
types of IDS’s. 
1. Milestones 
The experiment’s start date is 1 May 2004 and will run consecutively for a time 
period long enough to collect quantifiable data, tentatively 19 June.  This will allow a 50 
day observation / collection period.  Various methods that detect and capture probes and 
other malicious activity will be used.  Upon completion, an analysis of the collected data 
will begin. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced the reader to a significant problem encountered when 
only a signature based IDS is used.  Furthermore, it presented general descriptions of 
those complementary devices that work with IDS’s in a Defense-in-Depth posture.  It was 
not this chapter’s intent to delve deeply into their individual abilities or characteristics.  It 
































III. TEST BED SETUP AND CONFIGURATION 
Any intelligent fool can make things bigger, more complex, and more 




The intent of this chapter is to detail the IDS experiment configuration.  It will list 
the arrangements of the hardware, software, and network components that comprise the 
experimental lab. 
The network is comprised of desktop computers and network IDS servers that will 
maintain an operational working status for the entire projected test time. 
B. HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE CONFIGURATION 
The equipment that will be utilized in this experiment consists of six Intel based 
personal computers and one Dell 1U rack-mountable server that all operate on one Fast 
Ethernet network.  The network is furthermore described. 
1. Internet Access 
Internet access is granted via the DIRECWAYr broadband Internet Service 
Provider (ISP).  This connectivity is a bidirectional satellite antenna that operates at 1370 
megahertz with upload/download rates of 899/60, respectively.  See Table 6 for details.  
Since this is a broadband connection, its operational status is expected to be continuous 
for the entire experiment period.  The MODEM that is used with this system has the 





Table 6.   Broadband Reports Speed Test 
 
2. Router, Switch, Hubs, and Cables 
The gateway for the network is the NETGEARr Cable / DSL Web Safe Router # 
RP614.  This is a four port router with 10/100 Mbps automatic sensing switch.  It comes 
preconfigured with TCP/IP networking to include network address translator (NAT) and 
port forwarding.  The router has been enabled to keep access logs and will periodically 
send those logs to a Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) account.  The wide area 
network (WAN) IP address is 67.44.111.178 while the local area network (LAN) address 
is 10.11.12.1. 
The network switch that is employed is the NETGEARr FS605 Fast Ethernet 5 
port switch.  Two hubs will be used, the NETGEARr DS108 10/100 dual speed 8 port hub 
and the ASOUNDr 10/100 dual speed 8 port petit hub. 
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Additionally, category 5 (CAT 5) cable will be used.  This will help ensure that a 
100 Mbps flow rate is achieved. 
The LAN Internet Protocol (IP) address range consists of the non-routable Class 
C address space of 10.11.12.0/24 and is designated as the STOOGE-CENTRAL network. 
3. Desktop Computers and Servers 
The following computers connect directly to the router.  Their configurations are 
as follows: 
a. Computer 1 [MAGIVENS] 
• P4 - 2 GHZ microprocessor, 992 MB of RAM 
• IP Address:  10.11.12.6 
• Windows XPr Professional with Service Pack 1 
• SYMANTECr Norton AntiVirus 2004 
• ISS BlackIcer Defender 
• STOPZillar pop up protection 
b. Computer 2 [SWEETKELLY] 
• P4 - 1.8 GHZ microprocessor, 128 MB of RAM 
• IP Address:  10.11.12.2 
• Windows XPr Professional with Service Pack 1 
• SYMANTECr Client Firewall 
• NORTON AntiVirus Corporate Edition 
• ISS BlackIcer Defender 
• STOPZillar pop up protection 
The following computers connect to the switch.  Their configurations are 
as follows: 
c. Computer 3 [SAMBA SERVER] 
• P4 – 2 GHZ microprocessor, 512 MB of RAM 
• IP Address:  10.11.12.7 
• Linux RedHat 9 






d. Computer 4 [LARRY] 
• P2 – 450 MHZ microprocessor, 256 MB of RAM 
• IP Address:  10.11.12.4 
• Windows XPr Professional with Service Pack 1 
• SYMANTECr Client Firewall 
• NORTON AntiVirus Corporate Edition 
e. Computer 5 [CURLY-SERVER] 
• P2 – 450 MHZ microprocessor, 256 MB of RAM 
• IP Address:  10.11.12.3 
• Windowsr 2000 Server with Service Pack 3 
• FTP Server 
• IIS Server 
• Microsoft SQL Server with Service Pack 3 
4. Enclave Boundary Defense Configuration 
It is the intent of this experiment to monitor and measure those nefarious attempts 
to penetrate the STOOGE-CENTRAL network.  Therefore, two network based IDS’s will 
be used.  They will be incorporated as the network’s perimeter’s defense mechanisms and 
will capture all traffic that traverses the network.  Their configurations are detailed 
below. 
a. Pentiumr Server [MOE] 
• P2 – 450 MHZ microprocessor, 256 MB of RAM 
• IP Address:  10.11.12.5 (management NIC) 
• 2nd NIC connected to Hub for traffic monitoring 
• Still Secure Border Guardr Enterprise Edition Signature Based IDS 
Software 
b. Dell 1750 Server 
• Lancope StealthWatchr Anomaly Based IDS 
• IP Address:  10.11.12.10 (management NIC) 
• 2nd NIC connected to Hub for traffic monitoring 
Figure 3 below portrays this network and Figures 4 and 5 display a 








Figure 4.   Shields Up Vulnerability Assessment Part A 
 
Management interface Links 









Figure 5.   Shields Up Vulnerability Assessment Part B 
 
C. STOOGE-CENTRAL IDS’S OVERVIEW 
This section will detail the characteristics about the two IDS servers. 
1. Signature Based IDS 
The signature based IDS detects malicious traffic through a patented process 
called Dynamic Attack Detection (DAD) technology [BG-03].  This is a combination of 
rule-set methods that utilize the Open-Source signature based IDS software, SNORT.  
The signature based IDS’s foundation is the SNORT based rule-sets, however, they have 
been greatly enhanced in both performance and CPU efficiency.  It uses the following 
methods to detect intrusion attempts. 
a. Stateful Packet Analysis  
This is achieved through SNORTS Stream4 and Frag2 pre-processors.  
Stateful inspection and analysis prevents mischievous intrusion attempts and increases 





b. Signature Analysis 
The signature based IDS maintains a knowledge-base of known signatures 
obtained from the Open-Source arena and those crafted by the user.  These signatures 
provide the necessary pattern matching capability and content analysis needed to detect 
known attacks. 
c. Protocol/Anomaly Analysis  
The signature based IDS’s protocol anomaly detectors build models of 
transmission control protocol (TCP) IP protocols using specifications / request for 
comments (RFCs). This detection method ensures that events within a session conform to 
the proper state as defined by the protocol. Protocol / anomaly analysis is used to detect a 
wide range of known and unknown attacks [BG-03]. 
d. Layer 2 Analysis  
Detects invalid and malicious activity at OSI layer 2 to include both 
duplicated and spoofed media access control (MAC) addresses. 
2. Signature Based IDS Functionality 
The following describes the signature based IDS’s basic functions and is taken 
from vendor literature: 
a.  Detect 
An attack is launched against your network and the signature based IDS 
identifies and stops the attack. 
b. Qualify and Respond 
The signature based IDS’s response is based on its configuration: 
• block the attack 
• alert and prompt 
• block the attack by a responsive policy or custom command script 
• ignore this instance 
• take action at a later time. 
• ignore the attack – If configured, it will ignore the attack. This is allowed 
if certain hardware or applications are not installed on your network 
c. Manage and Report 
Analyze and report on attack activity. It sends e-mail alerts and logs all 
attack activity and produces various reports. 
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Figure 6.   Signature Based IDS’s Detection Cycle [From: BG-03] 
 
3. Anomaly Based IDS 
The anomaly based IDS monitors, detects, and responds to unwarranted access 
attempts and internal misuse on networks.  The appliance recognizes zero-day attacks, 
responds with various alarm mechanisms, and creates forensic data of network activity. 
The appliance approaches intrusion detection/prevention through a behavior-
based architecture that responds to statistical anomalies that occur within a network.  It 
characterizes and analyzes the data that flows between IP devices on the network to 
differentiate abnormal network behavior from normal network behavior [SW-03].  Unlike 
signature based IDS’s, the appliance detects out-of-profile behaviors without state-fully 
inspecting packet traffic nor impeding volume throughput. 
4. Anomaly Based IDS Functionality 
The following describes the anomaly based IDS’s basic functions and is taken 





a. Concern Index 
Functionality is achieved through a patented “Concern Index” mechanism 
that is integrated within the appliance.  The appliance measures the level of threatening 
activity occurring at the host level, and cumulatively, at the network level.  When 
intrusive activity occurs on a host, the Concern Index (CI) accumulates points every time 
the activity occurs. 
Each network host has an independent concern index threshold.  As the 
concern index increases and exceeds the threshold, the appliance discretely notifies the 
administrator of the activity. 
b. Target Index 
The product used for this experiment also utilizes a “Target Index” that 
triggers when activity exceeds a pre-determined threshold.  The alarm indicates that the 
target IP has received a number of probes or other malicious threats and has exceeded the 
set threshold [SW-03]. 
c. Behavior Profiling 
• Host Profiling is the process of passively identifying and categorizing 
network resources.  Acting as a sort of “passive port scanner,” the 
appliance monitors network hosts’ activity and builds a profile for each 
network host. 
• Traffic Profiling monitors packet rate, bandwidth consumption, protocol 
usage, and traffic history statistics.  Traffic profile thresholds are factored 
in to the flow based statistical analysis algorithms. 
d. Flow-Based Statistical Analysis 
The appliance uses a unique, patent pending flow-based packet capturing 
and analysis engine.  As data-grams are received through the NIC’s, they are fed into a 
flow analysis engine that separates and categories the active data flows. 
Once these flows have been properly categorized, the appliance performs 
an analysis of the collected data, it checks both host and traffic profiles, and system-wide 




It is at this point that nefarious traffic is identified and reported.  As 
patterns emerge and suspect flows are identified, the appliance accumulates CI points for 
the suspect host and alarms the administrator of mischievous activity. 




Figure 7.   StealthWatch Triadic Threat Detection [From: SW-03] 
 
D. QUANTITATIVE MEASURABLE IDS CHARACTERISTICS 
In order to analyze all data collected properly during the experiment, it is prudent 
to identify metrics by which the data will be interpolated.  They were chosen because 
they provide the ubiquitous characteristics of most IDS’s on the commercial market 
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Determines which attacks an IDS can detect under ideal 
conditions.  For SIGNATURE BASED IDS’s, consists 
of counting the number of signatures and mapping them 
to a standard naming scheme. 
Probability of False 
Alarms 
Determines the rate of false positives produced by an 
IDS in a given environment during a particular time 
frame. A false positive is an alert caused by normal non-
malicious background traffic. 
Probability of 
Detection 
Determines rate of attacks detected correctly by an IDS 
in a given environment during a particular time frame. 
Resistance to Attacks 
Directed at the IDS 
Demonstrates IDS resistance is to an attacker’s attempt 
to disrupt the correct operation of the IDS. 
Ability to Handle 
High Bandwidth 
Traffic 
Demonstrates how well an IDS functions when 
presented with a large volume of traffic. 
Ability to Correlate 
Events 
Demonstrates how well an IDS correlates attack events. 
They may be gathered from IDS’s, routers, firewalls, 
application logs, or other devices. 
Ability to Detect Zero 
Day Attacks 
Demonstrates how well an IDS detects attacks that have 
not occurred before.  Anomaly based systems are better 
suited for this type of measurement. 
Ability to Identify an 
Attack 
Demonstrates how well an IDS can identify the detected 
attack by labeling each attack with a common name or 
vulnerability name or by assigning it a category. 
Ability to Determine 
Attack Success 
Demonstrates if the IDS can determine the success of 
attacks from remote sites that give the attacker escalated 
privileges on the compromised system. 
Capacity Verification 
for NIDS 
The NIDS demands higher-level protocol awareness 
than other network devices such as switches and routers; 
it has the ability of inspection into the deeper level of 
network packets. 
 
Table 7.   Quantitative Measurable Characteristics of IDS’s [From: NIST-03] 
 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter detailed the test bed hardware and software configuration of the 
STOOGE-CENTRAL network.  It depicted the setup of the two enclave boundary 
defenses that will be used to capture, monitor, and report all network traffic that traverses 
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this network.  Furthermore, it described in detail functionalities associated with these two 
network based IDS’s.  The chapter concluded by introducing the metrics that will be 




IV. TEST DATA RESULTS AND EVALUATION 
Anyone who has never made a mistake has never tried anything new. 
Albert Einstein 
A. PROLOGUE 
This chapter will discuss and describe the data normalization process and the data 
collected during the IDS experiment.  It will first detail all identified mischievous traffic 
collected during the experiment.  It will then discuss matters relevant to the signature 
based IDS followed by a discussion of those occurrences relevant to the anomaly based 
IDS.  To conclude the chapter, an IDS cumulative comparison analysis involving line 
plots, regression analysis, and significance testing will occur. 
B. DATA NORMALIZATION PROCESS 
1. Collection Period 
The IDS experiment collection date began 1 May 2004 and concluded 19 June 
2004.  This 50 day window allowed for the monitoring of traffic flow and the capture of 
traffic for a contiguous hourly timeframe.  At the experiment’s conclusion, reports were 
generated from both IDS appliances and subsequently imported into Microsoft’s Excel 
and Access programs.  Excel was chosen for use as the statistical analysis engine and 
Access for the data knowledge base. 
2. Identified Mischievous Occurrences 
The total mischievous traffic collected over the inclusive period was 7672 
conversations with the signature based IDS capturing 4085 and the anomaly based IDS 
reporting 3587.  Since it is the Information Assurance (IA) professional’s belief that 
anomaly based IDS’s incur more “false positives” than signature based systems, these 
“false positives” must be excluded from those identified mischievous occurrences.  False 
Positives are defined as “a positive result when in reality it is negative in nature” [WEB-
03].  Therefore, in order to rule out most false positives both reports were juxtaposed and 
a line-by-line comparison of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and date-time-groups 






Figure 8.   Total Mischievous Occurrence Diagram 
 
These common occurrences were then inspected for any STOOGE-CENTRAL 
internal LAN traffic, Yahoo CHAT “pings” and “logons,” conversations between the 
NPS 131.120.255.255 subnet that were not port 135 or port 445 virus traffic, and Hotmail 
e-mail traffic exchanges.  If identified as listed above, these occurrences were ruled out as 
“false positives” and subsequently subtracted from the 1412.  This reduced the 
mischievous common traffic of both the signature based and anomaly based IDS’s to 
1333 and 1369, respectively. 
3. Normalizing Data 
The method used to normalize the mischievous common traffic was first to import 
all data into Microsoft’s Excel.  In order to add consistency throughout the analyzing 
process, it was determined that comparing the number of mischievous common 
occurrences to the time of day would be the most appropriate measure.  Therefore, a 
spreadsheet was used to determine each occurrence’s date and time.  It looked at the time  
B A 
Total Mischievous Occurrences  
       (7672)  
B = Signature Based 
IDS Mischievous 
Occurrences (4085) 
`A = (B - A∩B) 
      = 2673 
A = Anomaly Based IDS 
       Mischievous Occurrences 
       (3587) 
`B = (A - A∩B)  
     = 2175
A∩B = 1412 
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and rounded either up or down to the “whole hour” based on the “half-hour” system.  If 
the time was greater than or equal to 30, the time was rounded up to the next whole hour, 
if it was less than 30, then it was rounded back to the original hour. 
This process provided the ability to categorize mischievous traffic into three 
groups of eight-hour time blocks.  All mischievous common traffic was then analyzed in 
time blocks that ranged from 0100 – 0800, 0900 – 1600, 1700 – 2400, and a 24-hour 
cumulative time block.  Once sub-divided into these three groups, a statistical analysis of 
this traffic began. 
C. SIGNATURE BASED IDS DATA DESCRIPTION 
The signature based IDS collected 53% of the total wayward traffic that traversed 
the STOOGE-CENTRAL network.  This amount includes both identified mischievous 
traffic and all false positives.  In order to assess the collected data fairly, it must be 
scrubbed for accuracy and all false positives removed.  Therefore, after excluding those 
considered false, 1333 conversations were considered as “roguish,” which equates to 
17% of the total amount of data collected.  Figure 9 graphically depicts this.   
 
Signature Based IDS 
17%
83%
Mischievous Traffic (1333) / 
Total Collected Traffic (7672)
The 17% represents:  ((A∩B - false positives) / total 
collected traffic)
 
Figure 9.   Signature Based IDS Harmful Traffic 
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Analysis of this traffic reveals that in the 50 day window most occurred during the 1700 – 
2400 timeframe.  Figure 10, below, reveals this and the signature based IDS Pie Chart 
found in Figure 11 shows each number of occurrence’s percentage.   
 
Signature Based IDS Occurences 























Figure 10.   Signature Based IDS Bar Graph 
 












Figure 11.   Signature Based IDS Pie Chart 
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1. 0100 - 0800 Time Frame Analysis 
Table 8, below, represents this time frame with the number of total mischievous 
occurrences per rounded hour.  It also includes the Standard Deviation (σ ), Mean (µ ), 
Median, and Mode for this period.  Figure 12 portrays the number of roguish occurrences 
for each hour in a bar graph. 
 
0100 - 0800 Time Period  Standard Deviation 
Rounded Hour Total 14.17 
1 62  
2 36 Mean 
3 34 43.63 
4 24  
5 31 Median 
6 49 42.5 
7 59  
8 54 Mode 
Grand Total 349 #N/A 
 
Table 8.   Signature Based IDS 0100 – 0800 Time Frame 
 
Signature Based IDS Occurrences






















Rounded Hour  
 
Figure 12.   Signature Based IDS 0100 – 0800 Bar Graph 
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When analyzing the standard deviation for this period and all subsequent periods 
for both the signature based and anomaly based IDS’s mischievous traffic, application of 
the “68-95-99.7” rule applies [MOORE-01].  This rule states that “in the normal 
distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ :” 
• 68% of the observations fall within σ  of the mean µ . 
• 95% of the observations fall within 2σ of µ . 
• 99.7% of the observations fall within 3σ ofµ . 
A plot of this time period’s total roguish occurrences per rounded hour reveals 
that only 62.5% of occurrences fall within σ  of µ .  Although this number falls outside 
the 68% rule and is not significantly high, it must be mentally noted. 




Figure 13.   Signature Based IDS 0100 – 0800 Distribution Curve [From: CSUSB-04] 
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Figure 14, below, represents a line plot of the total mischievous occurrences 
collected during the 50 day test date range specifically for this time period. 
 
Signature Based IDS Line Plot
(0100 - 0800) 




















Drop Series Fields Here
 
Figure 14.   Signature Based IDS 0100 – 0800 Line Plot 
 
2. 0900 – 1600 Time Frame Analysis 
Table 9, below, represents this time frame with the number of mischievous 
occurrences per rounded hour.  Figure 15 portrays the number of occurrences for each 











0900 - 1600 Time 
Period  Standard Deviation 
Rounded Hour Total 18.05 
9 95  
10 48 Mean 
11 48 61.25 
12 48  
13 42 Median 
14 65 56.5 
15 72  
16 72 Mode 
Grand Total 490 48 
 
Table 9.   Signature Based IDS 0900 – 1600 Time Frame 
 
Signature Based IDS Occurrences

























Rounded Hour  
 




A plot of these occurrences per rounded hour reveals that, for this time period, 
75% of occurrences fall within σ  of µ .  This number falls well within the 68% rule.  
Figure 16 represents Table 9’s statistical data. 
 
 
Figure 16.   Signature Based IDS 0900 – 1600 Distribution Curve [From: CSUSB-04] 
 
Figure 17, below, represents a line plot of these mischievous occurrences 




Signature Based IDS Line Plot
(0900 - 1600)






















Figure 17.   Signature Based IDS 0900 – 1600 Line Plot 
 
3. 1700 – 2400 Time Frame Analysis 
Table 10, below, represents this time frame with the total mischievous 
occurrences per rounded hour.  Figure 18 represents this in a bar graph. 
 
1700 - 2400 Time Period  Standard Deviation 
Rounded Hour Total 20.59 
17 71  
18 62 Mean 
19 64 61.75 
20 91  
21 41 Median 
22 37 63.00 
23 86  
24 42 Mode 
Grand Total 494 #N/A 
 
Table 10.   Signature Based IDS 1700 – 2400 Time Frame 
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Signature Based IDS Occurrences

























Rounded Hour  
Figure 18.   Signature Based IDS 1700 – 2400 Bar Graph 
 
A plot of these occurrences per rounded hour reveals that, for this time period, 
only 50% of occurrences fall within σ  of µ .  Although this number falls well outside the 
68% rule, it too must be kept in mind. 





Figure 19.   Signature Based IDS 1700 – 2400 Distribution Curve [From: CSUSB-04] 
 
Figure 20, below, represents a line plot of these mischievous occurrences 




Signature Based IDS Line Plot
(1700 - 2400)






















Figure 20.   Signature Based IDS 1700 – 2400 Line Plot 
 
4. Signature Based IDS Cumulative 24 Hour Period 
Table 11 below, represents this cumulative period with the total mischievous 
occurrences per rounded hour.  Figure 21 represents this in a bar graph. 
 
24 Hour Time Period  Standard Deviation 
Rounded Hour Total 19.07 
1 62  
2 36 Mean 
3 34 55.54 
4 24  
5 31 Median 
6 49 51.50 
7 59  
8 54 Mode 
9 95 48 
10 48  
11 48 Range 
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12 48 71 
13 42  
14 65 Minimum 
15 72 24 
16 72  
17 71 Maximum 
18 62 95 
19 64  
20 91 Standard Error 
21 41 3.89 
22 37  
23 86 Confidence Level (95.0%) 
24 42 8.05 
Grand Total 1333  
 
Table 11.   Signature Based IDS Cumulative 24 Hour Period 
 
Signature Based IDS Occurrences

























Rounded Hour  




A plot of these occurrences per cumulative time frame reveals that, for this time 
period, 70.8% of occurrences fall within σ  of µ .  This high percentage makes it 
tempting to assume that the signature based IDS proves the Null Hypothesis as 
statistically significant; however, further testing must occur.   




Figure 22.   Signature Based IDS Cumulative Distribution Curve [From: CSUSB-04] 
 
Figure 23, below, represents a line plot of these mischievous occurrences 




Signature Based IDS Line Plot
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Figure 23.   Signature Based IDS Cumulative 24 Hour Period Line Plot 
 
The preceding figure reveals that although, as previously noted in Figure 10, most 
wayward occurrences were recorded in the 1700 - 2400 time block, the actual time with 
the highest amount of nefarious traffic is 0900. 
D. ANOMALY BASED IDS DATA DESCRIPTION 
The anomaly based IDS collected 47% of the total mischievous traffic that 
traversed the STOOGE-CENTRAL network.  This total amount includes both 
mischievous traffic and all false positives.  In order to assess the collected data fairly, it 
must be scrubbed for accuracy, which means removing all false positives.  Therefore, 
after excluding those considered false, 1369 conversations were considered as “roguish,” 




Anomaly Based IDS 
18%
82%
 Mischievous Traffic (1369) /
 Total Collected Traffic (7672)
The 18% represents:  ((A∩B - false positives) / total 
collected traffic)
 
Figure 24.   Anomaly Based IDS Harmful Traffic 
 
Analysis of the mischievous traffic reveals that in the 50 day window most traffic 
collected for the anomaly based IDS occurred during the 0900 – 1600 timeframe.  Figure 






Anomaly Based IDS Occurrences
























Figure 25.   Anomaly Based IDS Bar Graph 
 













Figure 26.   Anomaly Based IDS Pie Chart 
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1. 0100 - 0800 Time Frame Analysis 
Table 12, below, represents this time frame with the number of mischievous 
occurrences per rounded hour.  It also includes the Standard Deviation (σ ), Mean (µ ), 
Median, and Mode for this period.  Figure 27 portrays these occurrences for each hour in 
a bar graph. 
 
0100 - 0800 Time 
Period  Standard Deviation 
Rounded Hour Total 12.89 
1 63  
2 42 Mean 
3 30 42.63 
4 26  
5 33 median 
6 41 41.5 
7 52  
8 54 mode 
Grand Total 341 #N/A 
 
Table 12.   Anomaly Based IDS 0100 – 0800 Time Frame 
 
Anomaly Based Occurrences 













Rounded Hour  
Figure 27.   Anomaly Based IDS 0100 – 0800 Bar Graph 
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A plot of these occurrences per rounded hour reveals that, for this time period, 
75% of occurrences fall within σ  of µ . 
Figure 28 represents Table 12’s statistical data. 
 
 
Figure 28.   Anomaly Based IDS 0100 – 0800 Distribution Curve [From: CSUSB-04] 
 
Figure 29, below, represents a line plot of these mischievous occurrences 
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Figure 29.   Anomaly Based IDS 0100 – 0800 Line Plot 
 
2. 0900 – 1600 Time Frame Analysis 
Table 13, below, represents this time frame with the number of total roguish 
occurrences per rounded hour.  Figure 30 portrays these occurrences for each hour in a 
bar graph. 
 
0900 - 1600 Time 
Period  Standard Deviation 
Rounded Hour Total 15.45 
9 102  
10 69 Mean 
11 51 68.75 
12 62  
13 55 Median 
14 68 68.5 
15 71  
16 72 Mode 
Grand Total 550 #N/A 
 




Anomaly Based Occurrences 












Rounded Hour  
 
Figure 30.   Anomaly Based IDS 0900 – 1600 Bar Graph 
 
A plot of these occurrences per rounded hour reveals that, for this time period, 
87.5% of occurrences fall within σ  of µ .  This number falls well within the 68% rule.  




Figure 31.   Anomaly Based IDS 0900 – 1600 Distribution Curve [From: CSUSB-04] 
 
Figure 32, below, represents a line plot of these mischievous occurrences 




A nomaly B ased  ID S Line Plo t
50  D ays @  2 4  Hours p er  D ay








9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
T ime
T ot al
D at e ( A ll)
Sum o f  Occurrence2
R ounded  Hour
Drop Series Fields Here
 
Figure 32.   Anomaly Based IDS 0900 – 1600 Line Plot 
 
3. 1700 – 2400 Time Frame Analysis 
Table 14, below, represents this time frame with the number of mischievous 















1700 - 2400 Time 
Period  Standard Deviation 
Rounded Hour Total 17.62 
17 78  
18 60 Mean 
19 76 59.75 
20 72  
21 53 Median 
22 34 65 
23 70  
24 35 Mode 
Grand Total 478 #N/A 
 
Table 14.   Anomaly Based IDS 1700 – 2400 Time Frame 
 
Anomaly Based Occurrences 















Rounded Hour  
Figure 33.   Anomaly Based IDS 1700 – 2400 Bar Graph 
 
A plot of these occurrences per rounded hour reveals that, for this time period, 
only 62.5% of occurrences fall within σ  of µ . 






Figure 34.   Anomaly Based IDS 1700 – 2400 Distribution Curve [From: CSUSB-04] 
 
Figure 35, below, represents a line plot of these mischievous occurrences 
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Figure 35.   Anomaly Based IDS 1700 – 2400 Line Plot 
 
4. Anomaly Based IDS Cumulative 24 Hour Period 
Table 15 below, represents this cumulative period with the number of 
mischievous occurrences per rounded hour.  Figure 36 represents this in a bar graph. 
 
24 Hour Time Period  Standard Deviation 
Rounded Hour Total 18.45 
1 63  
2 42 Mean 
3 30 57.04 
4 26  
5 33 Median 
6 41 57.50 
7 52  
8 54 Mode 
9 102 72 
10 69  
 62 
 
11 51 Range 
12 62 76 
13 55  
14 68 Minimum 
15 71 26 
16 72  
17 78 Maximum 
18 60 102 
19 76  
20 72 Standard Error 
21 53 3.766 
22 34  
23 70 Confidence Level (95.0%) 
24 35 7.790 
Grand Total 1369  
 




Anomaly Based IDS 
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Rounded Hour  
Figure 36.   Anomaly Based IDS Cumulative Bar Graph 
 
A plot of the mischievous occurrences per cumulative time frame reveals that, for 
this time period, 66.6% of occurrences fall within σ  of µ .  This low percentage makes it 
easy to assume the Null Hypothesis will be found statistically significant. 






Figure 37.   Anomaly Based IDS Cumulative Distribution Curve [From: CSUSB-04] 
 
Figure 38, below, represents a line plot of these mischievous occurrences 
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Figure 38.   Anomaly Based IDS Cumulative 24 Hour Period Line Plot 
 
The preceding figure reveals that, as previously stated, most roguish occurrences 
were recorded in the 0900 – 1600 time period. 
E. SIGNATURE BASED/ANOMALY BASED IDS CUMULATIVE 
COMPARISON 
The preceding two sections introduced the reader to nefarious traffic, that when 
analyzed, affords one the ability to make statistical inferences to the performance levels 
of both IDS’s.  This section will cross-analyze that data. 
1. Combined Line Fit Plot 
Figure 39 is a combined line plot that shows a graphical representation of the 
wayward traffic collected for both systems over the entire test date range.  Although 
similar in appearance, there are a few several differences. 
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Figure 39.   Anomaly Based/Signature Based IDS Combined Line Plot 
 
As one can see, the diamond-line represents the signature based IDS while the 
square-line represents the anomaly based IDS.  The sporadic peaks noted around hours 9, 
20, and 23 on the blue line suggests increased activity, however, it is presumed these 
types of IDS’s will have this pattern since they work off known signatures.  Since a 
signature is easy to recognize, it does not take much nefarious activity to trigger the 
alarm.  A good analogy would be a “hair” trigger on a revolver. 
The pattern presented by the pink line suggests that since the anomaly based 
system must first develop a baseline of the network, it runs like a well-paced engine and 
easily captures traffic that steps outside this baseline.  It then returns to status quo once 
the activity has passed. 
2. Regression Analysis 
Before delving into the statistics generated from the experiments regression 




The Least-Squares Regression Line is the line that minimizes the sum of the 
squares of the vertical distances of the observed y-values from the line to as small as 
possible.  If the variables are perfectly correlated (r =1 or r = -1), then the change in the 
predicted response yˆ  (pronounced y-hat) is the same (in standard deviation units) as the 
change in x.  If -1 ≤  r ≤  1, the change in yˆ  is less than the change in x [MOORE-01].  
This means if the data points lie closer to the line, there is better fit and data correlation. 
R2 (square of the correlation) is explained as the fraction of the variation in the 
values of y that is explained by the Least-Squares Regression of y on x.  This square 
basically gives a better feel for the strength of the association.  Perfect correlation (r = -1 
or r = 1) means the points lie exactly on the line.  If R2 = 1, then the variation in one 
variable is accounted for by the linear relationship with the other variable.  If r = -0.7 or r 
= 0.7, then R2 = .49 and about half the variation is accounted for by the linear 
relationship.  Using the .49 example shows that .7 correlation is about halfway between 0 
and ±  1 [MOORE-01]. 
The signature based IDS line fit plot found in Figure 40 suggests that with an 
increase in time of day there is tendency to move farther from the mean.  By analyzing 
the R2 value (.1283) found in Table 16 and Figure 40 helps explain there is about a 13% 
link between time of day and number of occurrence.  Therefore, although the regression 




IDS Summary Output 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.36 
R Square 0.13 
Adjusted R Square 0.09 
Standard Error 18.20 
Observations 24.00 
 





Signature Based IDS Line Fit Plot
50 Days @ 24 Hours per Day















Figure 40.   Signature Based IDS Line Fit Plot 
 
Conversely, the anomaly based IDS line fit plot found in Figure 41 suggests that 
with an increase in time of day there is tendency to move closer to the mean.  However, 
analyzing the R2 value (.0772) found in Table 17 and Figure 41 explains there is about an 
8% link between time of day and number of occurrence.  Therefore, although the 
regression line shows much stronger correlation than the signature based IDS regression 
line, the low R2 value also demands another test. 
 
Anomaly Based 
IDS Summary Output 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.28 
R Square 0.08 
Adjusted R Square 0.04 
Standard Error 18.12 
Observations 24.00 
 
Table 17.   Anomaly Based IDS Summary Output 
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Anomaly Based IDS Line Fit  Plot
50 Days @ 24 Hours per Day
















Figure 41.   Anomaly Based IDS Line Fit Plot 
 
3. Test of Statistical Significance 
A test of significance finds the probability of getting an outcome as extreme or 
more extreme than the actually observed outcome [MOORE-01]. 
Originally stated in the hypothesis, a significance level (α ) of .05 will be used as 
the measure to prove the Null Hypothesis statistically insignificant.  With this level, we 
are requiring that the data give evidence against Ho (Null Hypothesis) so strong that it 
happens no more than 5% of the time when Ho is true.  Therefore, in order to prove the 
Null Hypothesis as statistically insignificant the P-value (one-tail) that results from a 
significance test must be ≤  to α . 
It was determined that the z-Test is best fit for this comparison.  The z-Test makes 
the following assumptions:  A Sample Random Size (SRS) of n, known population 
standard deviation σ , and either a normal population or a large sample.  The SRS used 
for this test was the cumulative data tables of both IDS’s. 






z-Test: Two Sample for Means   
 Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 57.04 55.54 
Known Variance 340.30 363.48 
Observations 24.00 24.00 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 11.00  
z -1.75  
P(Z<=z) one-tail 0.04  
z Critical one-tail 1.64  
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.08  
z Critical two-tail 1.96  
 
Table 18.   z-Test of Significance 
 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the data normalization process, which included the 
collection period, the process that determined data legitimacy, and how the legitimate 
data was normalized into 8-hour time blocks.  It analyzed the mischievous traffic collated 
by both the signature based and anomaly based IDS’s and represented this data in 
statistical tables, normal distribution curves, and line plots.  It concluded with a 
cumulative comparison of both IDS’s which included a line plot analysis, regression 





V. EXPERIMENT ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
In the field of observation, chance favors only the mind that is prepared. 
Louis Pasteur 
A. PROLOGUE 
This chapter will articulate the results found in Chapter IV, Section E, signature 
based/anomaly based IDS cumulative comparison.  It will first examine and draw 
inferences regarding the line fit plots of both IDS’s.  This will be followed by a synopsis 
of the regression analysis and the results found in the z-Test of Significance.  The chapter 
will then make remarks regarding the Null or Alternative Hypothesis as being statistically 
significant.  It will conclude with a general thesis summary. 
B. EXPERIMENT ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
1. Synopsis of Line Fit Plots 
The information generated from the line fit plots affords the reader the ability to 
formalize an opinion regarding each IDS’s nefarious traffic.  As previously mentioned, 
the time period with the most traffic occurrences for the signature based IDS was 1700 – 
2400 while the busiest time period for the anomaly based IDS was the 0900 – 1600 time 
block.  The introduction of the graphical line fit plot helps the reader visualize this 
activity and also helps to surmise a conclusion.  Furthermore, when overlaid, the line fit 
plots show both similarities and differences of traffic captured by both IDS’s.  However, 
this does not provide conclusive evidence to support either hypothesis.  It was used to 
provide a visual reference for the reader and further testing is warranted. 
2. Synopsis of Regression Analysis 
When a table is presented that portrays regression data, it is not easy to visualize 
the emerging data pattern.  However, when one is able to see a regression line along with 
its associated plot points, one can easily see the overall trend of this data.  A regression 
line helps to fit the data by minimizing the sum of the squares of the vertical distances of 
the observed y-values from the line.  If the points are close to the regression line, then 
there is evidence supporting a tight fit and strong correlation.  The regression lines  
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developed for both IDS’s clearly indicate a favorable tendency towards the anomaly 
based IDS and the alternative hypothesis.  However, this is still not enough conclusive 
evidence to support this inference. 
In addition, it was previously explained that the closer the R2 (square of the 
correlation) is to ±  1, the more strength of association, and all of the variation in one 
variable (time) being accounted for by the linear relationship with the other variable (# of 
occurrences).  The R2 values for the signature based and anomaly based IDS are .1283 
and .0772, respectively.  Since these values are close to zero, this method also can’t be 
used to solely provide a conclusion and therefore, another test must be used. 
3. Synopsis of the z-Test Analysis 
The z-Test of significance was the last test used to find support of either 
hypothesis.  As previously mentioned, the z-Test assumes that a Sample Random Size 
(SRS) of size n, with a known population standard deviation σ , and either a normal 
population or a large sample will be used.  These assumptions fit the cumulative data 
tables of both IDS’s. 
Statistical inference contends that in order to prove the Null Hypothesis 
statistically insignificant, a p-value must be generated that is ≤  the significance level (α ) 
used.  This thesis used .05 for α  and upon conclusion of the z-Test, the p-value generated 
was .04.  This fact in itself proves the Null Hypothesis as statistically insignificant and 
shows favor in support of the Alternative Hypothesis.   
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter reiterated the information generated from the line fit plots and 
regression analysis and furthermore discussed each IDS’s test results, formalizing a 
conclusion.  It then re-visited the z-Test that provided conclusive evidence in support of 
the Alternative Hypothesis.  It made reference to the p-value (.04) that was calculated 






Furthermore, if this p-value is paired with the line-fit plots and the information 
generated from the regression analysis, there is apparent and overwhelming evidence that 
anomaly based IDS’s not only are required in a Defense-in-Depth environment, but also 
provide substantial return-on-investment.  This also provides conclusive evidence to rule 
out Type I and Type II errors.   
D. THESIS SUMMARY 
As one can tell, the anomaly based IDS kept pace and at times, simply out-worked 
the signature based IDS.  With new or yet unknown viruses (aka:  zero- day attacks), the 
signature based system is left idle until provided a virus signature or pattern.  Whereas, 
the anomaly based IDS, during this same zero-day attack, has already sounded the alarm 
and notified the security manager or system administrator.  Additionally, a point must be 
made that the turn-around time from the initial zero-day occurrence to the time when a 
vendor supplies an identifying pattern signature has been significantly reduced.  What 
used to take weeks is now only a matter of days.    
It was not this thesis’ intent to review a particular name-brand of IDS.  This thesis 
focused more on the holistic view or approach to intrusion detection and how those types 
of IDS’s work.  There was no favoritism or bias towards the two systems used for testing.  
The author would have gladly used other available means.  Furthermore, this thesis was 






























VI. FUTURE WORK AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
One small step for man, one giant leap for mankind. 
Neil Armstrong, 1969 
A. PROLOGUE 
This chapter will present areas the author feels warrants future study. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Security Switches 
These devices are synonymous with intrusion prevention devices, security blades, 
or other specialty appliances.  Whatever their name, it is clear there is an evolution 
towards dedicated hardware that optimizes security functionality into a single box, blade, 
or chip [INFOSEC-03].  For further reading, follow this hyperlink to the Information 
Security, November 2003 article, p. 59.  
http://infosecuritymag.techtarget.com/ss/0,295796,sid6_iss205_art412,00.html 
2. Target Based Intrusion Detection Systems 
These systems squelch network noise to pinpoint the alerts you care about.  
Target-based IDS is a new technology that correlates knowledge about network topology, 
operating systems, and applications with incoming attack information [INFOSEC-04].  
For further reading, follow this link to the Information Security, January 2004 article, p. 
35. 
http://infosecuritymag.techtarget.com/ss/0,295796,sid6_iss306_art540,00.html 
3. Intrusion Prevention Systems 
As discussed in Chapter II, IPS’s are considered the next logical step in the 
evolution of IDS’s.  These systems are the combination of the blocking capabilities of 
firewalls with the deep packet inspection capability of IDS’s.  An IPS is defined as “any 
device (hardware or software) that has the ability to detect attacks, both known and 
unknown, and prevent the attack from being successful” [DESAI-03].  For further 






4.  Protocol Anomaly Detection 
A new variant of anomaly detection has been incorporated into IDS’s in recent 
years.  Instead of training models on normal behavior, protocol anomaly detectors build 
models of TCP/IP protocols using their specifications.  Statistical anomaly detection is 
plagued by the inability to create a normal model of network traffic statistics.  Protocol 
anomaly detection is much easier, however, because protocols are well defined and a 
normal “use” model can be created with greater accuracy.  Protocols are created with 
specifications, known as RFCs, to dictate proper use and communication.  All connection 
oriented protocols have state.  Certain events must take place at certain times.  As a 
result, many protocol anomaly detectors are built as state machines.  Each state 
corresponds to a part of the connection, such as a server waiting for a response from a 
client.  The transitions between the states describe the legal and expected changes 
between states [DAS-01].  For further reading, follow the link to the SANS article. 
http://www.sans.org/rr/papers/30/349.pdf 
5. Collaborative Intrusion Detection Systems 
CIDS employs multiple specialized detectors at the different layers - network, 
kernel and application - and a manager based framework for aggregating the alarms from 
the different detectors to provide a combined alarm for an intrusion.  For further reading, 
follow the link to the IEEE article. 
http://csdl.computer.org/comp/proceedings/acsac/2003/2041/00/20410234abs.htm 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced the reader to areas that might be of interest or useful in 
complementing those devices used in a Defense-in-Depth environment. 
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APPENDIX.  COMPLEMENTARY INTRUSION DETECTION 
SYSTEM EXPERIMENT 
A. PROLOGUE 
The following article from InfoWorld Magazine is an IDS comparison/experiment 
the author was involved with.  Several IDS’s, to include signature, anomaly based, and 
hybrids were provided by vendors for analysis.  The comparison ran parallel to the 
author’s IDS experiment and therefore provided valuable insight for his experiment.  
Although different metrics were used to analyze the IDS’s, the knowledge gained from 
establishing the network, installing and configuring all systems, and interacting with the 
vendors proved invaluable. 




























C. APPENDIX SUMMARY 
This appendix provided a quick synopsis of the complementary IDS comparison 
and the actual article from InfoWorld Magazine.  This author collected no monies from 
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